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ABSTRACT 
 
We compare the effects of SOX 302 and SOX 404 mandated internal control system disclosures on 
firm credit ratings, changes in credit ratings, and firm cost of debt. We find results consistent with 
the interpretation that disclosure of firm internal control deficiencies provides incremental 
information to credit analysts which is negatively associated with a firm’s credit rating, and 
positively associated with cost of debt. Additionally, we find that while disclosures under SOX 302 
are negatively related to credit ratings, this effect largely disappears once prior 404 disclosures 
are considered. Importantly, the impact of 404 internal control disclosures is significant 
regardless of past 302 disclosures. These results contribute positively to the public policy debate 
concerning the efficacy of auditor attested internal control evaluations required by SOX 404. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
he effectiveness of firm internal control systems is an issue identified by many constituents as crucial 
to quality external financial reporting. The importance of effective internal control systems achieved 
a more prominent public profile since the exposure of a series of accounting scandals shortly after 
the turn of the millennium in which reported earnings were vividly misstated. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX) in response to these events in an effort to help restore investor confidence in financial reporting 
as well as in the U.S. capital markets. Section 302 requires management to provide quarterly reports about the 
effectiveness of firm internal controls. Section 404 of SOX extends 302 further to require the external auditors to 
independently attest to the effectiveness of its internal control systems and to publically report any material internal 
control deficiencies (ICD) discovered. Our research empirically examines the effect of reported material ICD on 
credit ratings, credit rating changes, and cost of debt. Importantly, we investigate the incremental benefits of the 
more detailed and auditor attested 404 disclosures on debt markets compared to the less detailed disclosures required 
under Section 302.
1
  
 
Prior literature in this area has primarily focused on the association between ICD and earnings quality, and 
the impact of ICD disclosure on cost of equity. We extend this research and examine whether SOX 302 and 404 
internal control disclosures provide useful information to knowledgeable capital market participants: creditors and 
credit rating analysts. At issue is whether the SOX 302 and 404 legislation, which requires ongoing monitoring and 
reporting costs, also results in significant economic benefits to the credit market, as claimed by law makers (U.S. 
House of Representatives 2005; U.S. Senate 2004). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to 
extensively examine the impact of SOX 404 ICD disclosures on credit ratings and ex post cost of debt by comparing 
the information content of the SOX 404 ICD disclosures to credit analysts and creditor versus that under SOX 302 
legislation. Lambert et al. (2007) outline a theoretical framework demonstrating that greater information risk is 
associated with higher cost of capital while Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) show empirically that firms with ICD are 
                                                 
1 See Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) for a detailed description of the differences in requirements for SOX 302 and SOX 404. 
T 
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associated with greater systematic risk. Thus, we predict that SOX 302 and 404 ICD disclosures provide useful 
information to credit analysts. Moreover, because SOX 404 ICD disclosures are audited by independent accountants 
and therefore, should be more accurate and rigorous, we posit that the SOX 404 ICD disclosures are more 
informative to credit analysts than SOX 302 disclosures. 
 
Our findings are consistent with the conjecture that firms reporting ICD have lower credit ratings and 
higher cost of debt than those not reporting ICD, ceteris paribus.
2
 This result remains robust after controlling for a 
variety of firm-specific factors. More importantly, our results indicate that the more stringent and detailed reporting 
requirements of Section 404 provide incremental information relevant to the determination of credit ratings and cost 
of debt, while the less-detailed disclosures required under SOX 302 do not appear to be a significant, independent 
factor of either.  Overall, these results provide empirical evidence consistent with the interpretation that SOX 404 
substantiation related to internal control evaluations provides useful information to credit analysts and creditors; and 
that these end users of financial information act in a manner consistent with this information being an important 
factor in determining their ratings. 
 
 Our findings augment and complement research conducted in the equity arena with respect to the effects of 
reported firm internal control deficiencies on firm value (e.g. Asbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Asbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2009; Doyle et al. 2007). An independent investigation of the effects of internal control deficiencies on credit ratings 
is important because substantive differences exist between equity holders and bondholders with respect to inherent 
risk and contingent claims on the firm. The primary external consideration of management is typically the interests 
of shareholders; the interests of debt-holders are often secondary.  Penman (2007) refers to this as the “moral 
hazard” of debt, which can result in decisions having differential effects on each constituency. Shareholders might 
prefer to engage in risky projects with high expected returns. Conversely, bondholders are unlikely to be rewarded 
for this additional risk because their returns are contractually established and would not share in any excess return. 
Higher risk projects can conceivably add to shareholder wealth through higher expected profits while increasing the 
risk of default to the bondholders and, therefore, reducing bondholder value.
3
 These inherent differences make the 
bond market potentially divergent from the equity market and, consequently, a valuable and direct setting in which 
to empirically examine knowledgeable end-user perceptions related to reported material internal control 
deficiencies.  
 
We add to the existing literature in at least two ways. First, our results empirically reinforce that SOX 404 
ICD disclosures are inversely associated with firm credit ratings and cost of debt as demonstrated in prior studies 
(Elbannan 2009, Dhaliwal et al. 2009). Elbannan (2009) shows that firms with ICD disclosed under SOX 302 and 
404 receive lower credit rating using data from 2003-2005.  In a concurrent paper, Dhaliwal et al. (2009) 
demonstrate further that SOX 404 ICD is associated with higher bond yields. Our paper differs from these two 
studies in that we present robust evidence that the more-detailed information provided under Section 404 of SOX 
provides incremental information to credit analysts with respect to the default risk of the firm as compared to the 
less-detailed and unaudited reporting required by SOX 302. 
 
 Our findings should be of interest to both investors and regulators, and contribute to the debate regarding 
the continuation of the SOX 404 requirement regarding the attestation of internal controls over financial reporting. 
While we provide evidence consistent with information benefits accruing to credit analysts, our research also 
indicates that firms maintaining effective internal control systems receive higher credit ratings which is consistent 
with a lower cost of debt capital. To the extent that reporting requirements of ICD help induce a firm to maintain a 
better system of internal control, the capital markets benefit by more effective firm reporting systems for financial 
statements, and the individual firm benefits through a higher credit rating. While our research supports the continued 
reporting of ICDs under SOX 404, it provides some evidence from the debt markets that might be used to question 
the efficacy of SOX 302 requirements. 
 
 
                                                 
2 We use deficiencies and ICD interchangeably throughout the text. 
3 For a more detailed discussion of differences between the interests of bond holders and shareholders, as well as the agency costs 
of debt, see Penman 2007, Asbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Beatty et al. 2008, Jiang 2008.  
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 The remainder of the paper is structured in the following manner. The next section provides information 
regarding internal control deficiencies, credit ratings, and a review of relevant literature. Section III describes the 
methodology while Section IV presents details regarding our sample. Sections V, VI, and VII provide the results. 
We finish with our conclusions and summary. 
 
II. MOTIVATION AND RELEVANT RESEARCH 
 
Internal Control Deficiencies and Regulatory Environment 
 
 Internal controls are defined as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives”, according to the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO)
4
. SOX Section 302 took effect on August 29, 2002 and required 
management to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting. It also requires the CEO/CFO 
to certify the internal control effectiveness over financial reporting in quarterly filings (SEC 2002). SOX Section 
404 requires management to issue a report on the assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial 
reporting in annual filings. Importantly, the external auditor must independently issue a report on the effectiveness 
of internal controls over financial reporting along with an attestation report on management’s assessment. Therefore, 
Section 404 institutes more rigorous disclosure by requiring an auditor to issue an adverse report with respect to the 
internal controls related to financial statements whenever one or more material ICD is discovered.  
 
 In March 2004, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued Auditing Standard No. 
2 (AS2), An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of 
Financial Statements”, which provides detailed guidance and procedures for internal control audits. AS2 became 
effective for firms with a fiscal year-end on or after November 15, 2004.
5
 The external auditor must issue an adverse 
opinion on the client’s internal control over financial reporting if the auditor establishes the existence of material 
ICD over financial reporting. Because of the auditor’s assertion, in concert with the detailed guidance from AS2, the 
disclosure of ICD after Section 404 became effective is considered to be more reliable than SOX 302 (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2008). 
 
 As prescribed in AS2, possible internal control deficiencies are classified into three categories: control 
deficiencies, significant deficiencies, and material deficiencies. Material deficiencies are the most severe and 
represent the focus of our study. Prior to the implementation of SOX Sections 302/404, the only time firms were 
required to report an internal control deficiency to the SEC was when they changed auditors and also discovered an 
ICD in the same year. Companies were required to start disclosing internal control deficiencies required by Section 
302 of SOX for firms with fiscal year ends after August 29, 2002. Subsequently firms with fiscal year-ends on or 
after November 15, 2004 (only accelerated filers) started to file audited internal control reports to the SEC required 
by SOX 404.  
 
Companies assert that costs to comply with Section 404, particularly the auditor attestation requirement, 
outweigh the benefits received by investors (e.g., American Bankers Association 2005; Microsoft 2005) and call for 
its repeal or modification. However, regulators insist that Section 404 should ultimately lead to higher quality 
financial reporting and, consequently, a lower cost of capital (U.S. House of Representatives 2005; U.S. Senate 
2004). Credit rating agencies have consistently stated that details related to firm internal control deficiencies provide 
useful information and can be an important factor in determining credit ratings (Moody’s Investor Service 2004, 
2007; Fitch 2005). 
  
                                                 
4 COSO refers to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, who undertook an extensive study 
of internal control to establish a common definition that would serve the needs of companies, independent public accountants, 
legislators, and regulatory agencies. It provided a framework of criteria that companies could use to evaluate the effectiveness of 
their internal control systems. COSO published its framework in 1992. 
5 In July 2007, PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is 
Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements, which supersedes AS2 for firms with a fiscal year-end on or after November 
15, 2007.  
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Research Related to Internal Control Deficiencies  
 
Extant research predominantly describes negative firm effects as a result of reported ICD, although a few 
studies in this group report weak associations. Doyle et al. (2007) assert that weak internal controls create 
opportunities for earnings management and accounting errors which is consistent with Kinney and McDaniel’s 
(1989) contention that weak internal controls can increase the probability of errors in accounting disclosures. Doyle 
et al. (2007) find that firms reporting material ICD have a weaker association between working capital accruals and 
cash flows than firms not reporting material ICD and conclude that material ICD are related to lower earnings 
quality. Similarly, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find a weaker mapping of accruals to cash flows along with more 
abnormal working capital accruals and abnormal total accruals for firms reporting material ICD. Chan et al. (2007) 
find mild evidence that firms reporting material ICD have more income increasing and absolute accruals than firms 
not reporting ICD supporting conclusions reached by previous studies. 
 
Ogneva et al. (2007) explore the relationship between first time ICD reports and firm cost of capital. The 
authors find higher implied cost of equity capital associated with ICD; however, this relationship disappears after 
controlling for known firm risk factors. Lambert et al. (2007) show that the quality of financial information and the 
system that produces it influence the firm’s cost of capital in both direct (assessment of the variance and covariance 
of cash flows by investors) and indirect (decisions made by managers) ways. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) examine 
the relationship between material ICD and firm risk characteristics in light of Lambert et al. (2007) and find that 
firms reporting material ICD indeed have higher betas, idiosyncratic risk, and cost of equity capital than firms not 
reporting material ICD.  
 
Hogan and Wilkins (2008) examine the effects of ICD on the costs of conducting an external audit of the 
firm’s financial statements. The authors report that firms reporting material ICD pay higher audit fees than control 
firms, and interpret their findings to imply that auditors increase their time and efforts when there is an increased 
level of control risk for the firm as signified by reported ICD. Beneish et al. (2008) examine stock returns around the 
announcement of ICD under SOX 302 (prior to implementation of 404) and the announcement of ICD under SOX 
404. The authors find a negative stock reaction for SOX 302 announcements, but no noticeable reaction to SOX 404 
announcements. They attribute the market’s non reaction to SOX 404 disclosure to the lower threshold of materiality 
required by auditors. In comparison, credit rating agencies seem to be more concerned about the ICD disclosed 
under SOX 404 (Moody’s 2004).   In both cases, this raises the question of whether both disclosures are now 
needed.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the differential information contents of SOX 302 and 
SOX 404 disclosure to credit rating agencies and creditors. Elbannan (2009) examines the disclosure of ICD under 
302 and 404 finding firms with ICDs are more likely to have lower ratings and issue bonds of speculative grade.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2009) finds that firm’s credit spread increases after the initial issuance of 404 ICD. The authors also 
report the effect is more informative for firms that are not monitored by banks or rating agencies. However, neither 
paper compares the incremental impact of SOX 404 disclosure over SOX 302 disclosure on credit rating and cost of 
debt.   
 
Credit Ratings and Cost of Debt 
 
Credit Ratings 
 
Credit ratings provide a succinct representation of analysts’ perception of default risk associated with a 
firm’s outstanding debt. The estimated probability of default is dependent upon a wide range of factors which 
includes a detailed examination of the firm’s financial statements and associated profitability ratios (S&P Ratings 
Group 2008). Analysts do not conduct an audit of the financial statements, but rely upon the independent attestation 
of the firm’s external auditor. Any additional information relating to the integrity and veracity of the firm’s financial 
statements would be important in establishing the level of confidence analysts place in the reported numbers. The 
internal control assessments mandated by SOX can provide additional information related to various aspects of the 
firm’s control effectiveness, and can have direct implications regarding the reported financial statements. Moreover, 
negative reports regarding a firm’s internal control processes can provide a more grievous signal concerning the 
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firm’s ability to control its operations (Moody’s Investors Services 2004).  Based upon this environment, we 
conjecture that SOX-mandated information concerning a firm’s internal control effectiveness should be associated 
with the firm’s credit ratings.  
 
 Credit ratings are important because they provide an independent appraisal to the market regarding the 
default risk associated with a firm’s debt. Firms raise substantially more “new” funds in the credit market every year 
than in the equity market to finance new and continuing activities and projects. For example, in 2005 companies 
raised $1,187 billion in the credit market compared to $141 billion in the equity market (Investment Dealer’s Digest 
(IDD) 2006). Typically, the process of issuing debt begins with the corporation obtaining a necessary credit rating 
for the issue from a major rating agency, such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, and ends with an investment 
banker bringing the issue to market. The rating agency’s very existence depends upon being independent, along with 
the associated credibility the public attributes to the ratings it issues. This logical assumption of independence is 
corroborated by research indicating ratings are motivated more by reputation protection than rating fees obtained 
from the issuers (Covitz and Harrison 2003).  This makes credit ratings an interesting and important area in which to 
explore the effects of SOX-mandated internal control assessments. 
 
Cost of Debt 
 
 We also examine the effects of internal control disclosures on a firm’s cost of debt. While credit ratings are 
determined by a team of rating analysts, a firm’s cost of debt is determined more directly by market investors and 
provides an alternative way to look at the effects of internal control deficiencies on the overall value of the firm. A 
significant body of research exists which explores various accounting-related questions by investigating effects on a 
firm’s cost of debt capital. For example, Anderson et al. (2004) examine board of director characteristics and 
accounting report integrity and find that more independent board of directors and larger board size result in a lower 
cost of debt. They also find that fully independent audit committees that meet frequently appear to increase the 
quality of accounting reports which correspondingly helps to reduce the cost of debt capital. Mansi et al. (2004) find 
that firms engaging a Big 4 auditor achieve lower debt costs through increasing the perceived reliability of their 
financial statements, as well as obtaining the additional insurance protection Big 4 auditors are conjectured to 
provide by ostensibly protecting investors from future losses from audit failure. In summary, there is a considerable 
literature that illustrates how examination of the cost of debt can provide beneficial insights with respect to questions 
germane to the accounting profession. We implement the approach and basic model described in Francis et al. 
(2005) and utilize a firm’s relative cost of debt to examine the effects of SOX 302 and SOX 404 ICD disclosures on 
a firm’s cost of debt capital. 
 
Primary Hypothesis  
 
 Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) find that ICD disclosures under the SOX 302 period have considerable 
classification errors. Because the SOX 302 and SEC interpretation do not provide any guidance or procedures for 
evaluating internal controls, it is not surprising that the ICD disclosure in the SOX 302 period is not entirely reliable. 
In contrast, SOX 404 mandates that independent auditors express an opinion over management’s evaluation of the 
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting. Moreover, the PCAOB issued AS2 which outlines 
detailed procedures for the audits of internal controls, and companies continued to also disclose ICD information 
under SOX 302 in the SOX 404 period. Beneish et al. (2008) find a negative stock market reaction to the 
announcement of ICD under 302 but not under 404 in contrast to the above information. We predict, with credit 
agencies placing value on the audit procedure, that the ICD disclosures required by SOX 404 provide richer and 
more accurate internal control information to the credit rating agencies relative to those required by SOX 302. Stated 
formally, our primary hypothesis is: 
 
H1:  Internal control deficiency disclosures based upon SOX Section 404 are more closely associated with the 
determination of firm credit ratings and cost of debt than disclosures provided by SOX Section 302. 
 
The results of our investigation into this hypothesis should provide beneficial insight regarding the 
importance of SOX 404 disclosures for credit rating analysts. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 We examine our hypothesis in three settings. First, we examine the relationship between ICDs and credit 
ratings. Next, we study ratings changes around the announcement of ICDS. And lastly, we consider the effect of 
ICDs on firm cost of debt. 
 
Ordered Logit Model for Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
 Based on prior research completed in the credit rating area (e.g. Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Asbaugh-Skaife 
et al. 2006; Jiang 2008; Lee 2008), we adopt the following ordered logit model for our cross-sectional analysis of the 
effect of internal control effectiveness over financial reporting on credit ratings. Our model controls for company 
and issue specific factors that are likely to affect bond ratings. 
 
RATING= Intercepts + β1(Internal Control) + β2SIZE + β3ROA + β4CFO+ β5LOSS + β6LEV + 
β7TIMES + β8SUBORD + β9CAPINT + β10BM  +  β11Ln(STD_RET) + β12MERGER+ 
β13RESTATE + β14RATINGt-1 + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e  
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 RATING is the numerical credit rating transformed from the Standard and Poor’s raw letter ratings as 
shown in Appendix A following the methodology utilized in prior literature (Ashbaugh–Skaife et al. 2006). 
RATING takes the values from 7 to 1 with a higher number indicating better credit ratings.  
 
 Our experimental variable is Internal Control. We use multiple measures to explore the relation between 
internal control effectiveness and credit ratings. The first measure, DEF404, takes the value of 1 if a company 
receives an adverse opinion on its internal control effectiveness with respect to financial reporting from its auditor as 
required by SOX 404, and 0 otherwise. The second measure, DEF302, takes the value of 1 if a company discloses an 
ICD in the first three quarters of the year under SOX 302. In order to examine the relative importance of SOX 404 
information versus SOX 302 information we develop a series of four indicator variables that we utilize to provide 
further insight into this issue. The first of these variables, DEF404+302, takes the value of 1 if a company receives 
an adverse opinion for an ICD from its auditor and it also disclosed an ICD under 302 earlier in the year, and 0 
otherwise. The variable, DEF404-302, takes the value 1 if a company receives an adverse opinion for an ICD from 
its auditor while having no 302 disclosure during the year. These variables allow us to examine the relative 
importance of a 404 disclosure versus 302 disclosures. Next we create DEF302+404 which takes the value 1 when a 
firm reports an ICD under 302 during the year and also had an adverse opinion for an ICD under 404 in the prior 
year. Our last measure is DEF302-404. It takes the value 1 when a firm reports an ICD under 302 during the year, 
but had no adverse 404 opinion in the prior year. These last two variables represent the importance of 302 
disclosures conditioned on information already announced based upon 404.  
 
 We include various firm-specific variables in model (1) to control for potential determinants of credit 
ratings based on prior literature (e.g. Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Asbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Jiang 2008; Lee 2008). Large firms (SIZE) have lower financial risk and less likely to incur credit default and, thus, 
is expected to be associated with higher credit ratings.  Firms with greater profitability (ROA) and higher level of 
cash flows (CFO) have stronger financial strength, and thus, are expected to have higher ratings. In contrast, firms 
reporting losses (LOSS) and firms with higher leverage (LEV) are more likely to incur financial default and, thus, 
receive lower ratings. Moreover, firms with higher times-to-interest earned ratio (TIMES) and firms with greater 
capital intensity (CAPINT) are found to be associated with sounder financial positions and, therefore, are rated 
higher. A firm is considered to receive lower credit rating if the firm has subordinated debt (SUBORD) because 
subordinated debts are financially riskier than senior debts. Firms with higher book-to-market ratio have poor 
market performance thus are expected to receive lower credit ratings. Jiang (2008) shows firms with greater equity 
volatility receive lower credit ratings and, thus, we include Ln(STDRET) in our model. To control for carryover 
effects from business transactions and past accounting problems, we include MERGER to indicate if a firms has 
been involved in a merger or acquisition and RESTATE to indicate if a firm has restated its earnings. Following 
Jiang (2008), we add lagged credit ratings RATINGt-1 to control for omitted correlated variables and autocorrelation 
of the error terms.  Finally, we include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects following Jiang (2008) and Lee 
(2008).  
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Impact of Internal Control Effectiveness on Changes in Credit Ratings 
 
 We next investigate whether announced internal control deficiencies have any impact on changes in a 
firm’s credit rating. We employ the same basic approach utilized in Equation (1) and develop the following ordered 
logit changes model to test our predictions. 
 
∆RATING_1M = Intercepts + β1 Internal Control + β2∆SIZE + β3∆ROA + β4∆CFO + β5∆LOSS + β6∆LEV + 
β7∆TIMES + β8∆SUBORD + β9∆CAPINT + β10∆BM + β11∆Ln(STD_RET) + 
β12∆MERGER+ β13∆RESTATE + e                                                                                   (2) 
 
∆RATING_1M is the change of Standard and Poor’s senior debt ratings in the month after the internal control report 
is filed with the SEC relative the debt rating in the month before the filing month.  
∆RATING_3M is the change of credit rating for the three-month window of [m-1, m+1] where ‘m-1’ is one month 
before internal control report filing month and “m+1” means one month after the internal control report filing 
month. 
 
Internal Control is the same as defined in Equation (1). Utilizing “∆” before other variables represents the 
change of the variable in current fiscal year relative to the prior fiscal year. These variables are also the same as 
defined in Equation (1). We include industry and year fixed effects to control for potential industry effects and the 
impact due to economic cycle on credit rating. The predictions on the signs of the control variables are the same as 
those in the levels regressions in Equation (1). 
 
Impact of Internal Control Effectiveness on Ex Post Cost of Debt 
 
 Next, we adopt the following model to test the impact of ICD disclosures on ex post cost of capital.    
 
COD= Intercepts + λ1(Internal Control) + λ2RATING + λ3SIZE + λ4ROA + λ5CFO+ λ6LOSS + λ7LEV + 
λ8TIMES + λ9SUBORD + λ10CAPINT + λ11BM + λ12Ln(STD_RET) + λ13MERGER+ 
λ14RESTATE + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e                                                  (3) 
 
Following Francis et al. (2005), COD is the ex post cost of debt, defined as total interest expense divided 
by the sum of average short-term and long-term debts.  Because credit rating is closely related to cost of debt, we 
control for the credit rating for the current period (RATING).  We predict that firms with better corporate credit 
rating incur lower cost of debt.  Similar to the control variables in Equation (1), we further control for various firm-
specific characteristics.  We expect large firms (SIZE), more profitable firms (ROA), firms with greater level of 
operating cash flows (CFO), firms with higher times-to-interest earned ratio (TIMES) and firms with greater capital 
intensity (CAPINT) report lower cost of debt.  In contrast, we predict that loss firms (LOSS), firms with 
subordinated debt (SUBORD), high leveraged firms (LEV), firms with greater equity volatility (STD_RET), firms 
having merger and acquisitions (MERGER) and firms restating prior financial statements (RESTATE) incur higher 
cost of debt. Finally, we include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
 
IV. SAMPLE 
 
 Variables related to the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting are obtained from the 
AuditAnalytics SOX 404 Internal Controls file for the period of 2004 to 2007. The file compiles auditors’ opinions 
on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. Credit ratings are downloaded from the Compustat 
Ratings file which reports the monthly domestic long-term issuer credit ratings of S&P 1500 companies. Firm-
specific financial information is also obtained from Compustat. After merging data from the three databases and 
deleting missing values, we have 4,825 firm-year (5,795 firm-quarter) observations for the SOX 404 (SOX 302) 
Disclosure sample, representing 1,377 (770) unique firms  for further analyses.  
 
 Table 1 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the SOX 404 sample, while Panel B provides the 
statistics for the SOX 302 sample. To mitigate the impact of outliers, all continuous variables except credit rating 
scores are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions. In the analysis of cost of debt, we delete the 
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top and bottom 1% of the distribution of cost of debt because of the noisiness of the measure (Francis et al. 2005).   
The mean (median) of the credit rating scores is 3.473 which is equivalent to a letter rating of “BBB-” to “BB+”.  
Among these observations, 312 observations report material deficiencies of internal control over financial reporting. 
 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: SOX 404 Disclosure Sample (Annual Sample) 
Variables N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
RATING 4,825 3.473 1.159 3 3 4 
RATEINGt-1 4,825 3.508 1.143 3 3 4 
DEF404 4,825 0.065 0.246 0 0 0 
SIZE 4,825 8.350 1.400 7.340 8.198 9.306 
ROA 4,825 0.097 0.063 0.057 0.088 0.130 
CFO 4,825 0.097 0.066 0.055 0.09 0.134 
LOSS 4,825 0.169 0.375 0 0 0 
LEV 4,825 0.296 0.192 0.165 0.265 0.384 
RD 4,825 0.014 0.029 0 0 0.013 
TIMES 4,825 2.140 0.896 1.530 2.006 2.642 
SUBORD 4,825 0.185 0.388 0 0 0 
CAPINT 4,825 0.636 0.386 0.306 0.603 0.928 
BM 4,825 0.450 0.672 0.261 0.444 0.658 
STD_RET 4,825 2.336 1.478 1.421 1.995 2.838 
MERGER 4,825 0.524 0.499 0 1 1 
RESTATE 4,825 0.092 0.289 0 0 0 
COD 3,575 0.070 0.021 0.057 0.068 0.081 
              
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
∆RATING[m-1, m+1] 4,570 -0.007 0.163 0 0 0 
∆SIZE 4,570 0.089 0.210 -0.009 0.06 0.147 
∆ROA 4,570 0.004 0.047 -0.011 0.003 0.017 
∆CFO 4,570 0.000 0.049 -0.023 0.001 0.023 
∆LOSS 4,570 0.014 0.382 0 0 0 
∆LEV 4,570 0.001 0.128 -0.037 -0.006 0.030 
∆RD 4,570 0.000 0.006 0 0 0 
∆TIMES 4,570 0.006 0.439 -0.137 0.039 0.194 
∆SUBORD 4,570 -0.011 0.202 0 0 0 
∆CAPINT 4,570 0.001 0.084 -0.028 0.004 0.033 
∆BM 4,570 0.046 0.318 -0.062 0.014 0.113 
∆STD_RET 4,570 0.148 0.380 -0.115 0.073 0.344 
∆MERGER 4,570 0.010 0.473 0 0 0 
∆RESTATE 4,570 -0.012 0.382 0 0 0 
 
Variable Definitions 
RATING  = Standard and Poor’s senior debt ratings made one month after SOX 404 internal control filing  
     month to the SEC. 
DEF404  = 1 if a company’s internal control over financial reporting has material deficiency, as identified  
                                by the external auditor, 0 otherwise. 
SIZE  = natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year. 
ROA  = return on assets, measured by earnings before interests and tax divided by total assets at the end  
                                of fiscal year. 
CFO  = operating cash flows scaled by total assets, both at the end of fiscal year. 
LOSS  = 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. 
LEV  = total long-term debt divided by total assets, both at the end of fiscal year. 
RD  = research & development divided by total assets, both at the end of fiscal year. 
TIMES  = natural logarithm of (1+ times-to-interest earned ratio). Times-to-interest earned ratio is  
                                measured by operating income before depreciation divided by interest expense. 
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Table 1: (cont’d) 
Panel A (cont’d) 
SUBORD = 1 if a company has a balance of subordinated debt, 0 otherwise. 
CAPINT  = gross PPE divided by total assets 
BM  = total equity divided by market value of equity, both measured at the year end. 
STD_RET = standard deviation of daily stock returns for the year. 
MERGER = 1 if a company has merger and acquisition activities, 0 otherwise 
RESTATE = 1 if a company makes an announcement of restatement of financial statements in the year,  
                                0 otherwise  
COD  = total annual interest expense divided by the sum of average short-term and long-term debts.  
 
∆RATING[m-1, m+1] 
  = change of credit ratings from one month prior to SOX 404 filing month [m-1] to one month after   
     SOX 404 filing month [m+1]. 
“∆” represents the change of the variable from previous year to current year. 
  
Panel B: SOX 302 Disclosure Sample (Quarterly Sample: Quarters 1-3) 
Variables N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
RATINGQ 5,795 3.515 1.129 3 4 4 
RATINGQ_1 5,795 3.520 1.132 3 4 4 
DEF302 5,795 0.062 0.240 0 0 0 
SIZEQ 5,795 8.300 1.351 7.351 8.217 9.261 
ROAQ 5,795 0.013 0.018 0.005 0.013 0.022 
CFOQ 5,795 0.042 0.048 0.014 0.035 0.065 
LOSSQ 5,795 0.135 0.342 0 0 0 
LEVQ 5,795 0.303 0.188 0.174 0.274 0.388 
RDQ 5,795 0.002 0.006 0 0 0 
TIMESQ 5,795 2.135 0.922 1.546 2.039 2.647 
SUBORDQ 5,795 0.164 0.370 0 0 0 
CAPINTQ 5,795 0.687 0.375 0.367 0.673 0.981 
BMQ 5,795 0.427 0.392 0.247 0.411 0.597 
STD_RETQ 5,795 1.839 1.097 1.157 1.687 2.360 
MERGERQ 5,795 0.382 0.486 0 0 1 
RESTATEQ 5,795 0.027 0.162 0 0 0 
CODQ 5,539 0.017 0.006 0.014 0.017 0.020 
       
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
∆RATINGQ[m-1, m+1] 5,322 -0.001 0.090 0 0 0 
∆SIZEQ 5,322 0.108 0.228 0.004 0.068 0.153 
∆ROAQ 5,322 0.000 0.017 -0.004 0 0.005 
∆CFOQ 5,322 -0.000 0.036 -0.014 0 0.014 
∆LOSSQ 5,322 0.001 0.356 0 0 0 
∆LEVQ 5,322 -0.001 0.088 -0.038 -0.009 0.023 
∆RDQ 5,322 0.000 0.002 0 0 0 
∆TIMESQ 5,322 -0.009 0.536 -0.174 0.028 0.209 
∆SUBORDQ 5,322 -0.005 0.178 0 0 0 
∆CAPINTQ 5,322 -0.006 0.096 -0.033 0.002 0.033 
∆BMQ 5,322 0.019 0.259 -0.062 0.008 0.094 
∆STD_RETQ 5,322 0.006 0.489 0 0 0 
∆MERGERQ 5,322 0.272 0.909 -0.190 0.090 0.618 
∆RESTATEQ 5,322 0.000 0.218 0 0 0 
 
 
 The descriptive statistics of the control variables are relatively consistent with prior research concerning the 
debt market (e.g. Jiang 2008; Ashbaugh–Skaife, et al. 2006). The mean and median of the natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZE) are 8.350 and 8.198. The sample is generally profitable (ROA is about 9.7%) and operating cash flows 
(CFO) account for about 9.7% of the total assets while 16.9% of firm-year observations report negative net income 
(LOSS). Long-term debt accounts for about 29.6% of total assets.  The natural log of times-to-interest earned ratio 
(TIMES) is 2.140 and is similar to that reported in Jiang (2008). A minority of the observations (18.5%) issue 
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subordinated debt (SUBORD) and gross PPE (CAPINT) accounts for 63.6% of total assets. The average book-to-
market ratio (BM) is 0.450 The mean of the standard deviation of daily returns (STD_RET) is about 0.019. More 
than half of the sample (52.4%) involves merger and acquisition activities (MERGER) and slightly greater than 9% 
of them have restatement announcements. Lastly, the cost of debt (COD) averaged 7% for the reduced sample 
(n=3,575). Overall, our sample appears to be representative of the type of company that issues public debt and 
should provide a reasonable setting in which to apply our analyses. 
 
 We also report the sample to examine the change of annual credit ratings.  The sample size is slightly 
smaller as we delete firm-year observations with only one-year data.  For brevity, we do not discuss these statistics 
and we believe these statistics are reasonable and consistent with other papers (Jiang 2008).   
 
 Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of the sample used for the SOX 302 analysis.  There are 5,795 
firm-quarter observations representing 777 unique firms during quarters 1 to 3.  We do not use quarter 4 for this 
analysis in that the fourth quarter SOX 302 report coincides with SOX 404 reports.  The descriptive statistics of 
credit ratings (RATINGQ) are comparable to those reported in Panel A.  The mean of SOX 302 ICD (DEF302) is 
0.062 indicating there are 357 firm-quarter observations reporting SOX 302 ICD during the period. The statistics for 
SIZEQ, LOSSQ, LEVQ, TIMESQ, SUBORDQ, CAPINTQ, BMQ and STD_RETQ are comparable to those of the 
annual variables reported in Panel A.  Those for ROAQ, CFOQ, RDQ, MERGERQ, RESTATEQ and CODQ are 
lower than those annual counterparts but remain intuitively reasonable.     
 
V. RESULTS: CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
 The correlation matrix for the level of credit ratings variables is shown in Table 2 Panel A, while Panel B 
provides the correlations for the change in credit ratings variables. The largest bi-variate correlations with firm credit 
ratings are found for SIZE (0.574), TIMES (0.566), and Leverage (-0.483). All other variables display smaller 
correlations, but are also consistent with expectations for univariate analyses. Overall, there is nothing displayed in 
the correlations that would indicate a problem in running our multivariate analyses. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
 Table 3 provides the results from our ordered logit models and indicates that all models are highly 
significant (p <0.001). The dependent variable is the transformed S&P credit rating. In the first model, the 
independent variable of interest is DEF404 which is 1 for firms reporting material SOX 404 internal control 
deficiencies and 0 otherwise. The generalized R-square is 0.755 and is consistent with other studies (e.g. Jiang 2008; 
Lee 2008; Ashbaugh–Skaife et al. 2006). The coefficient on DEF404 is significant (p = 0.006) consistent with our 
supposition that firms with material deficiencies have significantly lower credit ratings compared to firms without 
material deficiencies, ceteris paribus. These results provide strong support for the prediction that internal control 
deficiencies are associated with lower credit ratings. The coefficients on the control variables are generally 
consistent with predictions and therefore not discussed for brevity. Overall, the results are consistent with findings 
from prior studies (e.g. Lee 2008; Jiang 2008; Ashbaugh–Skaife et al. 2006). 
 
 In our second model, we test our primary hypothesis and examine the importance of SOX 404 material 
internal control deficiency disclosures conditioned upon the existence of prior SOX 302 disclosures. Thus, we add 
two indicator variables. The first (DEF404+302) is equal to one if the firm indicated a material SOX 404 internal 
control deficiency identified by the auditors that was preceded by a material SOX 302 internal control deficiency 
announced by management in the previous three quarters. The second indicator variable (DEF404-302) is equal to 
one if the firm indicated a material SOX 404 internal control deficiency but was not preceded by a material SOX 
302 disclosure in the previous three quarters. Each of these two indicators variables are found to be significant in 
Model 2 with DEF404+302 (p=.031) displaying slightly more significance than DEF404-302 (p=.066). This is 
consistent with the SOX 404 disclosures attested by the auditors being an important factor in the determination of 
firm credit ratings, and being slightly more important when there was no prior warning of internal control difficulty 
from management via SOX 302 disclosures. These findings provide some preliminary support for H2.  
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Table 2:  Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A: correlation of level of the variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
 
RATING 
 
-0.187 0.948 0.574 0.384 0.306 -0.430 -0.483 0.130 0.566 -0.296 0.005 0.055 -0.392 0.077 -0.134 -0.434 
 
DEF404 -0.194 
 
-0.170 -0.107 -0.144 -0.123 0.167 0.075 -0.019 -0.163 0.055 -0.020 -0.042 0.012 -0.021 0.289 0.184 
 
SIZE 0.570 -0.109 0.574 
 
0.057 0.081 -0.166 -0.289 0.094 0.245 -0.169 0.034 0.009 -0.233 0.037 -0.074 -0.266 
ROA 0.381 -0.159 0.335 0.051 
 
0.684 -0.417 -0.192 0.044 0.626 -0.073 -0.028 -0.149 -0.084 0.055 -0.109 -0.149 
 
CFO 0.327 -0.130 0.296 0.089 0.671 
 
-0.309 -0.204 0.076 0.582 -0.108 0.242 -0.081 -0.071 -0.011 -0.085 -0.158 
 
LOSS -0.430 0.167 -0.370 -0.166 -0.441 -0.327 
 
0.303 0.066 -0.403 0.096 0.014 -0.073 0.298 -0.059 0.105 0.232 
 
LEV -0.482 0.063 -0.468 -0.273 -0.249 -0.262 0.259 
 
-0.191 -0.639 0.317 0.178 -0.248 0.209 -0.079 0.043 0.199 
 
RD 0.186 -0.008 0.179 0.127 0.115 0.073 0.014 -0.27 
 
0.259 -0.112 -0.235 -0.095 0.000 0.061 -0.014 -0.168 
 
TIMES 0.594 -0.173 0.562 0.253 0.660 0.616 -0.438 -0.706 0.267 
 
-0.257 -0.061 0.021 -0.168 0.113 -0.11 -0.266 
 
SUBORD -0.316 0.055 -0.318 -0.179 -0.065 -0.121 0.096 0.299 -0.100 -0.278 
 
-0.049 -0.041 0.103 0.028 0.049 0.182 
 
CAPINT 0.035 -0.023 0.043 0.055 -0.041 0.211 0.002 0.182 -0.278 -0.064 -0.062 
 
-0.045 0.015 -0.302 -0.020 0.079 
 
BM -0.107 0.007 -0.079 -0.004 -0.413 -0.322 0.065 -0.045 -0.210 -0.184 0.020 0.000 
 
0.031 0.054 -0.004 -0.001 
 
STD_RET -0.433 0.036 -0.426 -0.297 -0.061 -0.059 0.237 0.160 -0.007 -0.155 0.128 -0.018 0.140 
 
-0.045 -0.014 0.266 
 
MERGER 0.075 -0.021 0.084 0.038 0.087 0.015 -0.059 -0.073 0.114 0.133 0.028 -0.301 0.022 -0.038 
 
-0.043 -0.101 
 
RESTATE -0.139 0.289 -0.129 -0.078 -0.118 -0.092 0.105 0.041 -0.027 -0.127 0.049 -0.023 0.022 0.003 -0.043 
 
0.088 
                   All variables are defined in Table 1. Numbers above (below) the diagonal are from Pearson (Spearman) correlation.  
 
 
Panel B: correlation of change of the variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
∆RATING[m-1, m+1] 
 
-0.040 0.014 0.073 0.033 -0.044 -0.030 -0.009 0.064 -0.009 0.004 -0.050 -0.051 -0.013 -0.012 
 
DEF404 -0.041 
 
-0.054 -0.007 -0.011 0.040 -0.017 -0.008 -0.025 -0.059 0.019 -0.055 -0.069 -0.017 0.044 
 
∆SIZE 0.032 -0.070 
 
-0.151 -0.192 -0.059 0.086 -0.144 -0.113 0.062 -0.521 0.088 -0.118 0.158 0.001 
 
∆ROA 0.088 -0.029 -0.148 
 
0.421 -0.231 -0.096 -0.007 0.544 -0.009 0.009 -0.106 -0.030 -0.053 -0.007 
 
∆CFO 0.043 -0.013 -0.138 0.439 
 
-0.129 -0.117 -0.010 0.306 -0.023 0.124 -0.088 -0.035 -0.085 0.006 
 
∆LOSS -0.045 0.041 -0.082 -0.251 -0.119 
 
0.103 0.109 -0.245 -0.007 0.091 0.069 0.152 -0.006 0.009 
 
∆LEV -0.057 -0.020 -0.024 -0.206 -0.178 0.176 
 
0.013 -0.249 0.051 0.061 0.030 0.078 0.042 -0.013 
 
∆RD -0.014 0.003 -0.213 0.073 0.019 0.067 -0.019 
 
-0.027 0.008 0.119 -0.033 0.015 0.037 0.001 
 
∆TIMES 0.083 -0.034 0.013 0.601 0.303 -0.247 -0.357 0.024 
 
-0.055 0.011 -0.078 -0.062 -0.015 -0.008 
 
∆SUBORD -0.009 -0.059 0.055 -0.011 -0.015 -0.007 0.065 -0.016 -0.051 
 
-0.030 0.025 0.014 0.017 -0.024 
 
∆CAPINT 0.004 0.034 -0.553 0.090 0.133 0.086 0.088 0.172 -0.014 -0.027 
 
-0.001 0.124 -0.096 -0.008 
 
∆BM -0.036 -0.064 0.057 -0.213 -0.136 0.035 0.028 -0.000 -0.116 0.011 0.011 
 
0.272 -0.019 -0.009 
 
∆STD_RET -0.045 -0.063 -0.073 -0.04 -0.035 0.130 0.187 0.026 -0.065 0.022 0.077 0.269 
 
-0.039 -0.024 
 
∆MERGER -0.014 -0.017 0.145 -0.059 -0.077 -0.006 0.046 0.004 0.001 0.017 -0.102 0.003 -0.030 
 
-0.010 
 
∆RESTATE -0.008 0.042 0.001 -0.008 -0.001 0.009 -0.021 0.011 -0.010 -0.024 -0.002 -0.001 -0.019 -0.010   
All variables are defined in Table 1. Numbers above (below) the diagonal are from Pearson (Spearman) correlation.  
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Table 3:  Credit Rating and SOX 404 Disclosure 
Dependent variable = RATING 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Estimates p-values Estimates p-values 
(DEF404 =1) -0.583 0.006 
  (DEF404 + 302) 
  
-0.665 0.066
(DEF404 - 302) 
  
-0.544 0.031 
RATINGt-1 5.300 <.0001 5.300 <.0001 
SIZE 0.374 <.0001 0.375 <.0001 
ROA 7.801 <.0001 7.800 <.0001 
CFO 0.806 0.517 0.794 0.522 
LOSS -1.802 <.0001 -1.804 <.0001 
LEV -0.683 0.125 -0.685 0.124 
RD 3.939 0.073 3.939 0.073 
TIMES 0.531 <.0001 0.531 <.0001 
SUBORD -0.030 0.824 -0.031 0.819 
CAPINT -0.283 0.100 -0.282 0.101 
BM 0.178 0.049 0.178 0.049 
STD_RET -0.381 <.0001 -0.381 <.0001 
MERGER -0.216 0.024 -0.217 0.023 
RESTATE -0.281 0.106 -0.275 0.117 
Pseudo-R2 0.755 0.755 
Likelihood Ratio 11291.8 11291.9 
N 4,825 4,825 
 
 We attempt to gain more insight into this issue by changing the structure of our analyses to examine the 
importance of SOX 302 disclosures conditioned upon the existence of previous SOX 404 disclosures. We 
accomplish this by running a base SOX 302 model, and then including two additional indicator variables. The first 
(DEF302+404) is equal to one if the firm’s management indicated a material SOX 302 internal control deficiency 
that was preceded by a material SOX 404 internal control deficiency identified by the auditors in the prior year. The 
second indicator variable (DEF302-404) is equal to one if the firm indicated a material SOX 302 internal control 
deficiency but was not preceded by a material SOX 404 disclosure in the previous year. The results of these analyses 
are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  Credit Rating and SOX 302 Disclosure 
 Dependent variable = RATINGQ 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Estimates p-values Estimates p-values 
DEF302 -0.884 0.008 
  (DEF302 + 404) 
  
-1.030 0.002
(DEF302 - 404) 
  
-0.500 0.443 
RATINGQ_1 8.334 <.0001 8.340 <.0001 
SIZEQ 0.225 0.012 0.226 0.011 
ROAQ 16.493 0.009 16.782 0.007 
CFOQ -1.288 0.491 -1.398 0.456 
LOSSQ -1.224 <.0001 -1.233 <.0001 
LEVQ 0.246 0.770 0.235 0.778 
RDQ 9.699 0.455 9.784 0.450 
TIMESQ 0.663 <.0001 0.663 <.0001 
SUBORDQ -0.172 0.601 -0.175 0.595 
CAPINTQ 0.047 0.896 0.058 0.871 
BMQ -0.578 0.042 -0.583 0.038 
STD_RETQ -0.213 0.050 -0.212 0.051 
MERGERQ 0.135 0.444 0.136 0.440 
RESTATEQ 0.337 0.517 0.319 0.533 
Likelihood Ratio 15924.26 <.0001 15918.903 <.0001 
Pseudo-R2 0.901 0.901  
 N 5,795 5,795
Note: All variables are defined in Table 1. The estimations are based on data from Quarters 1 to 3.  Coefficients on year and 
industry dummies are not included for brevity.  P-values are two-tailed and are estimated based on t-values clustered by firm. 
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Model 3 demonstrates the results of including a single indicator variable (DEF302) which specifies the 
existence of a material weakness in internal controls as announced by a firm’s management in a SOX 302 
disclosure.  The single DEF302 variable (p=.008) is found to be negatively associated with a firm’s credit rating. 
Further examination of this result in Model 4 indicates that SOX 302 material weakness disclosure preceded by the 
auditor attested SOX 404 internal control weaknesses appear to be driving the overall results (DEF302+404 p-value 
= .002) while SOX 302 announced internal control weaknesses not preceded by a SOX 404 internal control 
weakness are not found to be a significant factor in the determination of a firm’s credit ratings (DEF302-404 
p=.443). These results are consistent with the conjecture that the most important component for determination of 
credit ratings are the auditor attested SOX 404 announcement of problems with internal control. These findings 
provide further support for our hypothesis. The next section investigates our question further by examining the 
effects of SOX 302 and 404 disclosures on credit rating changes.   
 
VI. CHANGES IN CREDIT RATINGS  
 
SOX 404 Announcements 
 
 We now examine the effects of announced internal control deficiencies in the context of credit rating 
changes.  Similar to our levels analyses described previously, we begin by examining the effect of a SOX 404 
announcement. The results are shown in Table 5 under Model 5 and illustrate that a SOX 404 internal control 
deficiency attested to by a firm’s auditors is negatively associated with a firm’s changes on bond ratings (p=.011). 
This is consistent with the interpretation that firm’s announcing a SOX 404 internal control deficiency are more 
likely to experience a lowering of their credit rating. 
 
 
Table 5:  Event Study: Impact of SOX 404 Disclosure on Credit Rating 
Dependent variable = ∆RATING[m-1, m+1] 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
Variables Estimates p-values Estimates p-values 
(DEF404 =1) -0.976 0.011 
  (DEF404 + 302) 
  
-0.927 0.042
(DEF404 - 302) 
  
-1.088 0.093 
∆SIZE 0.980 0.035 0.986 0.033 
∆ROA 5.775 <.0001 5.770 <.0001 
∆CFO 0.256 0.914 0.248 0.917 
∆LOSS -0.227 0.431 -0.227 0.431 
∆LEV -0.678 0.021 -0.678 0.021 
∆RD -4.433 0.724 -4.537 0.719 
∆TIMES 0.317 0.138 0.318 0.137 
∆SUBORD -0.277 0.437 -0.274 0.443 
∆CAPINT 2.071 0.057 2.081 0.056 
∆BM -0.607 0.078 -0.608 0.077 
∆STD_RET -0.638 0.024 -0.638 0.024 
∆MERGER -0.214 0.270 -0.214 0.272 
∆RESTATE -0.118 0.702 -0.115 0.711 
Likelihood Ratio 57.71 <.0001 57.77 <.0001 
Pseudo-R2 0.045 0.045 
N 4,570 4,570 
Note: All variables are defined in Table 1. Coefficients on year and industry dummies are not included for brevity.  P-values are 
two-tailed and are estimated based on t-values clustered by firm. 
 
 
To examine the effect of SOX 404 deficiencies conditioned upon a prior SOX 302 internal control 
deficiency announcement by management in the prior three quarters, we include the two indicator variables 
described earlier in the levels analyses (DEF404+302 and DEF404-302). The results are shown in Model 6 of Table 
5 and demonstrate the announcement of a SOX 404 internal control weakness by a firm’s auditors appears to be 
associated with a decrease in credit rating regardless of whether the firm’s management had made a prior SOX 302 
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announcement (DEF404+302 p=.042; DEF404-302 p=.093). This is consistent with the interpretation that the SOX 
404 announcement of a weakness by the auditor is the more important revelation to credit rating analysts. 
 
SOX 302 Announcements 
 
To help ensure our interpretation of the SOX 404 announcements are valid, we rerun our changes analyses 
by first inserting an indicator variable signifying a SOX 302 announcement, and then run an additional model with 
two other dummy variables that condition the SOX 302 announcement on a prior SOX 404 announcement.   The 
results of these analyses are shown in Table 6 where Model 7 demonstrates that a SOX 302 announcement is not a 
significant factor in the credit rating change model (DEF302 p=.742). Additional evidence is found in the results of 
Model 8 which illustrates that regardless of whether firm auditors made a SOX 404 attestation of an internal control 
weakness in the previous period (DEF302+404 p=.323) or not (DEF302-404 p=.239), there does not appear to be 
any significant association of management’s SOX 302 announcements with changes in a firm’s credit ratings. These 
results provide further corroboration of our previous results that are consistent with the auditor’s attestation of an 
internal control deficiency via a SOX 404 announcement being more relevant information than SOX 302 
announcements with respect to bond rating changes.  
 
 
Table 6:  Event Study: Impact of SOX 302 Disclosure on Credit Rating 
Dependent variables = ∆RATINGQ[m-1, m+1] 
 
Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Estimates p-values Estimates p-values 
DEF302 -0.143 0.742 
  (DEF302 + 404) 
  
0.229 0.323
(DEF302 - 404) 
  
-1.056 0.239 
∆SIZEQ 1.444 0.032 1.450 0.032 
∆ROAQ 17.322 0.028 16.587 0.038 
∆CFOQ 1.042 0.728 1.208 0.688 
∆LOSSQ -0.218 0.649 -0.230 0.625 
∆LEVQ 1.174 0.546 1.158 0.544 
∆RDQ 98.538 0.001 99.038 0.001 
∆TIMESQ 0.225 0.510 0.233 0.493 
∆SUBORDQ 0.564 0.571 0.579 0.563 
∆CAPINTQ 1.970 0.301 1.978 0.288 
∆BMQ -0.465 0.39 -0.442 0.411 
∆STD_RETQ -0.259 0.188 -0.247 0.216 
∆MERGERQ -0.352 0.036 -0.355 0.036 
∆RESTATEQ 0.022 0.853 0.083 0.571 
Likelihood Ratio 27.310 0.018 28.281 0.020 
Pseudo-R2 0.049 0.051 
N 5,322 5,322 
 
 
VII. INTERNAL CONTROL DEFICIENCIES AND COST OF DEBT 
  
To look at the issue from a somewhat different perspective and provide some sensitivity analyses with 
respect to our investigation of credit ratings, we extend our previous analyses to explore the effects of the existence 
of identified internal control deficiencies on a firm’s Cost of Debt. We estimate the Cost of Debt following Francis 
et al. (2005), and then investigate the association of SOX 404 and SOX 302 announcements in a manner similar to 
our levels analyses described above for credit ratings. First, we analyze the effects of SOX 404 conditioned upon the 
existence of a SOX 302 announcement in a prior period, and then we modify the model to investigate the effects of 
SOX 302 conditioned on a previous SOX 404 announcement. 
 
The results of our SOX 404 investigation with respect to a firm’s Cost of Debt are provided in Table 7 in 
which Model 9 demonstrates that the existence of an auditor attested internal control deficiency is highly associated 
with a firm’s Cost of Debt (DEF404 p=.001). These results are further supported in Model 10 when we condition the 
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SOX 404 announcement upon a previous SOX 302 announcement in the prior three quarters. Regardless of whether 
the firm’s management described an internal control weakness in a SOX 302 announcement (DEF404+302 p=.021) 
or did not announce an internal control weakness in the prior three quarters (DEF404-302 p=.002), the existence of 
an auditor attested SOX 404 deficiency remains positively associated with a firm’s Cost of Debt. 
 
 
Table 7:  Cost of Debt and SOX 404 Disclosure 
Dependent variables = COD 
 
Model 9 Model 10 
Variables Estimates p-values Estimates p-values 
Intercept 0.109 <.0001 0.109 <.0001 
(DEF404 =1) 0.006 0.001 
  (DEF404 + 302) 
  
0.005 0.021
(DEF404 - 302) 
  
0.006 0.002 
RATING -0.005 <.0001 -0.005 <.0001 
SIZE -0.001 0.143 -0.001 0.142 
ROA 0.093 <.0001 0.093 <.0001 
CFO -0.018 0.083 -0.018 0.083 
LOSS 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 
LEV -0.040 <.0001 -0.040 <.0001 
RD -0.038 0.171 -0.038 0.171 
TIMES -0.013 <.0001 -0.013 <.0001 
SUBORD 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
CAPINT 0.009 <.0001 0.009 <.0001 
BM -0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.006 
STD_RET 0.003 <.0001 0.003 <.0001 
MERGER -0.001 0.489 -0.001 0.487 
RESTATE -0.001 0.437 -0.001 0.453 
F-values 24.00 <.0001 23.68 <.0001 
Adj. R2 0.328 0.328 
N 3,575 3,575 
Note: All variables are defined in Table 1. Coefficients on year and industry dummies are not included for brevity.  P-values are 
two-tailed and are estimated based on t-values clustered by firm. 
 
 
 We next examine the importance of SOX 302 announcements on a firm’s Cost of Debt, conditioned on the 
existence of a prior SOX 404 announcement. The results provided in Model 11 of Table 8 demonstrate that a SOX 
302 announcement alone appears to be associated with a firm’s Cost of Debt (DEF302 p=.072). However, when the 
single DEF302 variable is removed, and replaced in Model 12 with our two DEF302 indicator variables conditioned 
on DEF404 prior status, we see the SOX 302 announcement is only significant when there was a previous SOX 404 
announcement in the prior period (DEF302+404 p=.066). The SOX 302 announcement is not found to be significant 
when it was not preceded by a SOX 404 announcement in the prior period (DEF302-404 p=.360). These results are 
consistent with the interpretation that the auditor attested SOX 404 announcement of an internal control weakness 
appears to be a significant factor in explaining a firm’s Cost of Debt while the SOX 302 management announcement 
alone does not carry nearly as much influence. These results provide further corroboration of H1 indicating that 
information related to internal control deficiencies are a significant component in determining a firm’s credit rating 
and Cost of Debt. Furthermore, the information provided by a SOX 404 announcement regarding the deficiencies 
appears to be the most influential component of these announcements. This is consistent with the interpretation that 
the external auditor’s attestation required by SOX 404 is considered important by debt market participants.   
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Table 8:  Cost of Debt and SOX 302 Disclosure 
Dependent variable = CODQ 
 
Model 11 Model 12 
Variables Estimates p-values Estimates p-values 
Intercept 0.025 <.0001 0.025 <.0001 
DEF302 0.001 0.072 
  (DEF302 + 404) 
  
0.001 0.066
(DEF302 - 404) 
  
0.001 0.360 
RATINGQ -0.002 <.0001 -0.002 <.0001 
SIZEQ -0.0004 0.006 -0.0004 0.006 
ROAQ -0.001 0.943 -0.001 0.939 
CFOQ 0.004 0.166 0.004 0.160 
LOSSQ 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
LEVQ -0.002 0.087 -0.002 0.090 
RDQ -0.059 0.059 -0.059 0.059 
TIMESQ -0.0001 <.0001 -0.0001 <.0001 
SUBORDQ 0.001 0.148 0.001 0.147 
CAPINTQ -0.001 0.132 -0.001 0.130 
BMQ -0.001 0.054 -0.001 0.056 
STD_RETQ 0.013 0.237 0.013 0.238 
MERGERQ 0.0002 0.418 0.0002 0.422 
RESTATEQ 0.0003 0.405 0.0003 0.375 
F-values 33.76 <.0001 33.32 <.0001 
Adj. R2 0.307 0.307 
N 5,539 5,539 
Note: All variables are defined in Table 1. The estimations are based on data from Quarters 1 to 3.  Coefficients on year and 
industry dummies are not included for brevity.  P-values are two-tailed and are estimated based on t-values clustered by firm. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Auditor attestation of firm internal control relating to external financial reporting systems is arguably an 
advancement in corporate disclosure that can help investors and creditors evaluate overall firm risk. We add to 
existing research by providing empirical evidence concerning the importance of SOX 404 internal control 
assessment disclosures for credit ratings. Our results are consistent with these disclosures providing useful 
information to credit analysts, and this information being a significant factor in determining a firm’s credit ratings. 
We also provide additional corroboration for our conclusions by finding these SOX 404 announcements to be 
significantly associated with changes in a firm’s credit ratings, as well as with a firm’s cost of debt. Finally, we find 
that the internal control system information provided by the firm’s management in SOX 302 do not by themselves 
appear to provide substantive information to the credit markets. Only when SOX 302 announcements are provided 
in conjunction with SOX 404 auditor attested internal control deficiencies do they become important in the 
determination of credit ratings and the firm’s cost of debt.  These results should be of significance to those interested 
in factors that influence a firm’s credit ratings, changes in credit ratings, and cost of debt. These findings should also 
be of interest to those involved in the public policy debate concerning the continuation of SOX 404 required 
disclosures related to internal control system deficiencies, and more generally, those interested in corporate 
disclosures.  
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